THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST II
CHRIST AND ANXIETY

In this article I am continuing some lines of thought already to be found in 'Christ and Sexuality'. Christ, I was saying, as a therapist for our wounded existence as sexual beings, is our healer not merely because he is like us, but because he is 'of us', or because he has 'the same nature' as we have. Nevertheless his healing comes not from any form of indulgence, but from his acceptance of the cross. It is what he has done in the possessing of his nature that affects our fuller possession of our own.

Beside sexuality, however, this age has brought home to us something else about ourselves, and it has done so in a new way. We are children not merely of incoherence and perversity, but of fear, even of dereliction. Anyone who would be relevant, let alone practical, must recognize that. Nor has any progress in religion or the human sciences succeeded in ridding us of the condition. To imagine that we have lived with, even if not through, the human hells of Auschwitz, saturation-bombing and nuclear destruction without being marked by them would be absurd. We are marked individually and collectively. Job, the prototype of anxiety before God, seen from the perspectives of Auschwitz, Bangladesh or even Northern Ireland, must be seen as an individual standing for other men. If he is a lone figure of dereliction, that is to tell us what dereliction is like, not to tell us that we are alone in today's afflictions. The middle sort of religious person today has a sense of distress which would have surprised some of yesterday's saints. Even our faith in God is coloured by our inescapable anxiety. In coming to us from the hells of human suffering, it is beginning to teach us how God has suffered. I think it brings us to believe even in the Triune God in a new way.2

It is true that before the unthinkable horrors of our own history had taken place, western philosophers had seen anxiety writ large as a basic human condition. We can come back to that. For the moment we observe that the simplest belief in Jesus is affected. We are aware of conflict, dread, resentment, of even a religious formlessness within and without.

This state is different from that which used to be known as spiritual 'desolation'. Then it was the subject in his private strivings towards 'perfection' who felt himself lost. He was lost within a known and accepted framework. The framework was that of an ordered world, itself the reflection of certain absolutes. But now the uncertainty and the threat seem to concern God and Jesus as much or more than the state of the subject. The neat divisions of private and public, religious and secular, worldly and other worldly

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have become quite blurred. Not only does the non-religious world appear to have overflowed into the religious world, but religious thinking itself appears to revolt against its own tradition. The 'de-privatization' of religious thinking has meant a violent change in the secure framework of the life of faith. As a result, religious certainties seem to have lost their stabilizing power. Security within is apparently no longer on offer. In the Catholic tradition the shock has been hard to assimilate. We inherit from St Thomas among others a tradition of thinking that holiness and wholeness are bound to overlap, that man will surely come to terms with himself and with his world, if he will but co-operate with grace.

The idea was reinforced in more romantic times by what seemed to be a self-evidently correct reading of the gospels. In the idyllic setting of Nazareth and by the Lakeside, did not Jesus exemplify and preach a gospel of pure joy, light and fellowship? 'The vision of heaven, far from driving them (his followers) to the hermit's cell or the pillar of the Stylites, sent them out onto the highways and lanes with songs on their lips and a passionate yearning to share the good news with their fellows'. Such language we might have expected to find in any book of pious meditations for religious which appeared between 1870 and 1939. But the worm in the fruit may be detected from the fact that the romantic tradition from Renan was strong in the highly original Cambridge theologian, C. F. Raven. Yet many of us have at one time cherished such a New Testament view. It was an attractive mental short-cut, and it was handed us on a plate. We should have recognized in it the 'heavenly man' of apocalyptic or even something of the gnostic Jesus. Lazily we did no such thing. We should not now really complain overmuch if the romantic short cut, laid over the medieval view of perfection and over the medieval world-view, appears to have let us down. It seems quite reasonable therefore to talk about an age of religious anxiety as an accompaniment to the age of secular anxiety in which we live.

First let us risk a few more generalizations about anxiety. In varying degrees and modes we are indeed familiar with it. Novelists and poets have shown us its dramatic possibilities. Psychology and sociology have analysed it. What then are they concerned with? With the experiences of uncertainty, with a mental disturbance or agitation which makes judgement difficult, perhaps even with a feeling of dread for which we can hardly account in an entirely 'objective' manner.

But we must map out the terrain a little more carefully than that. However widespread or familiar anxiety may be, it is still very difficult to define or even to describe. There is obviously a sense in which it is not even an in-

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tangible thing, not even a live abstraction like panic in a cinema when someone has shouted 'fire'. Even when for practical purposes we try to forget our anxiety or to put it into mental brackets, we know that there is no it which we can treat like that. The police may turn the hoses on a panic-stricken crowd, but we cannot do that on our private or shared anxiety; nor can any authority, much as it often may wish to, allay anxiety so suddenly. Yet, we would think, except in states of delusion, there should always be something, it may be clearly felt or it may be vaguely felt, to which our anxiety relates and which, for all we can tell, is responsible for its presence.

Freud's early view of anxiety was mechanistic. But he and his followers afterwards modified the rather simple notion that anxiety was the outcome of a mere suppression of somatic tension. That was clearly not the whole story. Anxiety must have some relational focus, commensurate with its force or not. And anxiety, it was thought, must be a state with a natural purpose. Could it not be in the nature of a signal informing the subject about some danger to himself? If a neutral observer could point to a recognizable 'objective' threat, then the signal could be called an 'objective' one. Were there nothing 'objective' to be discovered, then the whole situation would appear to be internal to the subject, and he would be called neurotic. The distinction, as I have outlined it, is of course far too crude. How for example are we to consider the subject whose anxiety centres on the personal values he holds, and which he feels to be threatened? The values themselves may, or may not, be 'objective'. So the threat may or may not be 'objective'. We must say again that anxiety is not a thing, but a highly relational state. The easiest and perhaps the commonest way in which it can be triggered off is to be found when interpersonal relations are, or are merely felt to be, at stake.

Even so it remains vague; and there are always many unknowns. But for our purpose we can say that the more anxiety is amenable to diagnosis, observation or control, the less it concerns us here. Oddly, where religious and anxiety meet is mainly on grounds that are vague; yet disconcertingly they are, though vague, none the less present. When anxiety can be 'objectified' or personalized, especially in terms like 'the jealous husband', 'Russian spies', or, as among the Belfast graffiti, 'the Pope', then the less is the concern expressed a specifically religious one. It is after all only by accident, for example, that the kind of anxiety known as 'scruple' can properly be called religious.

The specifically religious question of anxiety arises when God himself, the least as well as the most personal concept we can form of him, becomes invested with it. Need this ever be so? God is after all 'our Father', and we are 'sons in the Son'. The name of Father does not avoid the issue. Indeed, in the judeo-christian tradition, God himself is even given the name of 'Fear'. In an extraordinarily modern way, the book of Genesis makes the patriarch Jacob call God 'the Fear of Isaac'. Thus he can say, 'if the God of my fathers, the God of Abraham and the Fear of Isaac had not been on my side' (cf Gen 31, 42). The idea of fear, awe or dread as a part of man's response to God is
in the Old Testament accepted as valid. It is part of the demand that God makes upon man. God indeed makes moral demands on man, and the God who makes these demands appears to man from across a gulf of mysterious separation. We have inherited and accepted an Old Testament tradition which expects throughout that man's relationship with God will be characterized by fear. Thus correct religious conduct is 'God-fearing'. 'There can be no doubt', writes Eichrodt, 'that In the Old Testament statements about the fear of God, the inward agitation produced by the mysterium tremendum, emerges with extraordinary emphasis'.

We can call that 'modern' because, among other reasons, it is a modern discovery that such basic states as anxiety can pull in different directions at once. We find, for example, that 'trustful love' is associated with 'awe' of God, and so is confidence in him. In 'encounter' with God, a moment we expect to be one of intimacy and solace, we also find 'an absolute imperilling of human existence'. Disloyalty to God imperils the self, but concomitantly there is nevertheless 'a mysterious power of attraction which is converted into wonder, obedience, self-surrender, and enthusiasm'. But we can know God's will according to Old Testament teaching, and so 'quiet confidence in the manifest God gets the upper hand over terror'. Finally the deliberate decision to adhere to God is rewarded by our finding trustworthiness and reliability in our relationship with him.

II

It would thus appear that even in the Old Testament the all-embracing religious character of dread, awe and anxiety is consecrated in religious experience. Thinkers like St Augustine and Pascal have never shirked from seeing that belief in God as loving and rewarding cannot be separated from a quality of awe in faith. But placing anxiety or 'dread' firmly in the forefront of religious experience has been done for us by Kierkegaard. In the protestant tradition he more easily saw Angst ('dread' perhaps rather than 'anxiety') as one of the most fundamental affective human states, for it is the one which discloses how precarious the human situation is. By it we have some idea of our radical possibilities. We have a certain consciousness of our freedom. But what we really are, and what we are constrained to become, our 'facticity', that sets us in front of the most vital question - and we discover that we can hardly answer it. For Kierkegaard and for christians since then, the agonizing question remains, 'am I a christian?' Conscience no longer merely says 'am I doing the will of God?' The interiorizing movement has become deeper and darker, and the emphasis on will and decision is more severe. Personal genuineness seems harder to come by. A graduated scale of genuineness was encouraged by the efforts of casuistry. But today it hardly suffices

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6 Ibid., p 270.
7 Ibid., pp 273, 276.
any more. That is a point worth remembering when we are tempted to be-
moan the diminished frequency of private confessions. It should be accepted
that in parts of the catholic west we have a new generation, struggling with
all-or-nothing demands on the part of conscience. The new forms for private
confession are an instinctive attempt to cope with the situation. They touch
only the surface of the problem, which is deep and quite theological. The
fact is that today's anxieties are bringing some christians, many of them
catholic, nearer to Kierkegaard's dilemma, namely that we ought on the one
hand to preach anxiety as a gospel call, and the fact on the other hand that
apparently no-one can bear to hear it:

The immensely powerful tranquillizing means which Luther dis-
covered in the extremity of his Angst, in a fight to death in fear and
trembling and temptation - this is what is to be proclaimed as the
sole means for all. And yet there is not one individual in each genera-
tion with this experience.  

In the tirades of the Last Journals, Kierkegaard comes to the ironical con-
clusion that the lowest paganism is possible in protestantism, while it is
avoided in catholicism, which 'has a general supposition that we men are
scoundrels'.  Now Kierkegaard could be a master of religious caricature, not
least about himself. In a sense he was wrong about protestants, and he was
wrong about catholics. But when he was pointing to the all-or-nothing de-
mands of conscience before God, he was indeed pointing to an ambiguity in
christian existence. God demands and loves; we are attracted to belief in
him, but in the attraction we dread our total inadequacy.

I said I thought that a new generation in catholicism was trying to face up
to such demands. In the nature of things, it does so with hesitation and with
an inconsistency which it is easy to deride. To me, however, it sounds more
courageous than its opposite: 'that's not how we were brought up'; 'why
doesn't the Church exert its authority?'; 'why are children not taught the
catechism by heart the way we were?' Such exclamations betray a feeling of
insecurity, of abandonment, of being lost to fatherly authority. But the
question remains: when you feel insecure, which way should you face?
Should it be the way of nostalgia and regression? I presume the answer
should be No, and that is one reason why I connect the question of anxiety
with Christ. Only a hostile interpretation of Christ, such as the marxist one,
can leave us with the persuasion that his preaching of a kingdom not of this
world is merely recommending nostalgia and regression.

It has to be said very often that no-one can believe in Christ as though he
did so in a mental and cultural vacuum. Nor can we freeze some socio-
cultural framework of the christian past and choose to live in that alone.
As a result, the absoluteness of God's demands in faith is a mediated one.

8 Soren Kierkegaard, The Last Years, Journals 1835-5 (ed. and trans. Ronald Gregor
9 Ibid., p 324.
But it is also tempered by the fact that he made those demands first in his Son, his expressed and proclaimed Word incarnate. And he still makes those demands in that Son whom we can only know in our own theological skins, so to speak; that is to say, in the believing Church of today. If God demands, in any way we care to suppose, awe, dread, or anxiety on our part, then it will be the awe of the man of the twentieth century, not the awe of the man of biblical, medieval or victorian times.

But it would not be right to suppose that change takes place at a uniform rate. Our present day fear of evil does not have exactly the same shape as fear in ancient Christianity, much as the ancient Church can still be our teacher. The patristic Church, for example, was quite clear about its fear of demons, principalities and powers, divine judgment and wrath, corruption of our nature, of the race and of death. With a more objectified sense of dualism than we now have, there was an evil sphere into which man might lapse or which could reach out and grab a man for itself. ‘Thrusting down Satan and his wicked angels’ was a divine operation to keep the universe in balance, an idea recently as familiar as any, in the Leonine Prayers which were said at the end of every Low Mass. In ancient times pagans especially were seen as the victims of roving devils. The fact is that ‘all Christian language may turn demonic’. It is the one refuge of Christian anxiety. It was an easy in and some ways satisfactory one, when the cosmos itself was an intelligible and above all an ordered spiritual as well as material reality. Fear could thus be objectified. So in a previous age of anxiety, Christianity beat its rivals by out-bidding them. It is a sound historical point that in the fourth century and onwards, Christianity ‘wielded both a bigger stick and a juicier carrot’. Both the stick and the carrot have lasted well. It cannot be denied. But the world-outlook which helped to form them has lost even its vestiges. What has not gone is man’s anxiety, his dread. Nor on the other hand has his God and his Christ.

But when we come to the doctrine that this world is one of tribulation we come to something more abiding than the socio-cultural medium of the gospel truth. It belongs to the very message of the gospel, because it relates to the person of Christ. The impetus and authority of Jesus himself are there. ‘In the world you have tribulation (thlipsis); but be of good cheer, I have

10 Laeuchli continues: ‘faith becomes an idol and the powerful message of justification runs into a dead orthodoxy; the sacrament becomes opus operatum and the Church sets itself against the grace of God; the law strangles the freedom of the Spirit in the legalistic narrowness of humanistic Christianity. What does all this say? The rebellion of Adam returns in the Christian’s abuse of his speech’. Cf Samuel Laeuchli, The Language of Faith, An Introduction to the Semantic Dilemma of the Early Church (London, 1962). Laeuchli’s un-subtle protestant theses are easily recognizable. What interests us is the question of the ‘abuse of speech’ by Christians under stress and anxiety. Of course the types of abuse of Christian language have varied. Whereas formerly the tendency was always to over-objectify and to project evil, we now tend to over-subjectivize it, or to ‘introject’. The ‘demon’ within takes many forms today.

overcome the world' (Jn 16, 33). Here the Jesus of the ‘little flock’ gives a
message to future generations, tempted as they will be, by anxiety and un-
certainty arising within and without the community of faith. Such pain and
anxiety can be overcome because Jesus has overcome. Here, one can say, is
the better established catholic tradition and theology of anxiety, surely a
successful rival to that other tradition of faith-experience which propounds
the necessity of anxiety or dread as a parameter to the very possibility of
Christian godliness.

Certainly, the theology that Christ’s victory gives grace and salvation,
because evil and the grounds of fear have been overcome, is well established.
I am certainly not proposing that we should go back upon it. Fear of the
principalities and powers, as we know from the Captivity Epistles, must now
be considered a vain fear. In Christ, God has disarmed them, triumphed
over them and raised us up (cf e.g. Col 2, 15; Eph 2, 6). The world-view in
which the theologia gloriae was expressed is that of the New Testament. In it
world-anxiety could be pinpointed, personalized and vanquished.

But, as I have recently argued elsewhere, we should be prepared to re-
think the self-sufficiency and the scope of the doctrine of the theologia gloriae.12
That is not to deny the truth of the theologia gloriae, nor to question its per-
fectly valid context. Still, our relationship with God is mysterious enough
not to be wholly comprehended in one theology. God’s Word and work in
his Son is indeed a way of victory. But, just as Paul was left with a problem
on his hands over the apparent continuance of evil and the infliction of
anxiety on the part of the principalities and powers, so the simple statement
of Christ’s victory still leave us with the problem of the completion of the
victory. It is something like the interim period we recollect at the end of
World War II, between what was called VE-Day and VJ-Day, a victory that
was not yet a victory. In that case one victory completed another. In this
case we may say that another way of seeing how Christ relates to our anxieties
is compatible with the first. The classical name of the alternative way is the
theologia crucis. That too has a truth value. If we take seriously the proposition
that ‘by the cross the “sufferings of God” reveal to the world his involvement in
the fate of his creation’, then we can take seriously the specifically Christian
value of man’s anxiety in faith.13 In the way of the theologia gloriae, God’s im-
novable serenity is a firm reassurance during tribulation. In the victory of
Christ, the God who calls us is far from sin and death; in the godforsakenness
of Christ, God suffered and died. He who is God knows our basic dread and
anxiety.

III

In speaking of ‘Christ and Sexuality’, I endorsed the idea that it is now
clearly wrong to continue thinking that the believer’s love of God cannot in

12 Cf supra, footnote n. 2.
the slightest degree 'depend upon his urges or his sexuality'. It would be equally wrong to think that the love of God cannot depend upon anxiety. As we have been saying, anxiety has a special role to play in the structure of our belief and in our love of God as well.

Can we now go on to say that the phenomenon is observable in our catholic believing communities? If it is true that we are in an age of religious anxiety, which mirrors the anxiety of the secular world, then it would be wrong to consider religious anxiety as a massive deviation. In any case, the signs are that we are going to have to live with it for some time to come. A few simple reflections should bring that out.

The catholic Church has now made itself much more conscious than it has been since the Reformation that it is a pilgrim Church. The Constitution on the Church has thrown strong emphasis upon the doctrine of the 'people of God'. Whenever possible we now try in church life to insist upon the lack of difference between us as members of the Church. Priests and religious tend to feel the effects of this change more than do the pew-bound sunday laity. The individual thus comes to ask himself, and it is done with varying degrees of awareness, about the exact nature of his or her role. The so-called search for identity among priests and religious is now a byword. When the doctrine of the undifferentiated group is so much to the fore that Vatican II can teach us that the christian community, so far from being bound to uniformity, is to be seen as mysteriously conterminous with the whole community of mankind, then the individual must question himself and his role (cf Lumen Gentium, 1; Gaudium et Spes, 23ff). He must do so because the larger the group to which he belongs appears to be, the less certain to him is his identity or role within the group. The individual who was not ready for such a doctrine has been in a sense left high and dry. The point at issue is, of course, not whether or not such a doctrine is faithful to the teaching of Jesus, but whether or not a relatively sudden shift of emphasis has, on 'the purely natural' plane, contributed to the factor of religious anxiety.  

Again, on 'the purely natural' plane we can accept that church structures, and the structures within religious orders, have in the past made a valuable contribution to the 'belongingness want', and even to the 'power want' of many of their members. A great number of clerical jokes have in the past

14 Cf my 'The Humanity of Christ I; Christ and Sexuality', The Way (July 1975), p 212.  
15 The phrase 'on the purely natural plane' is used only as a piece of theological shorthand to point to human existence as though only in potentiality for religion and grace. I am not of course advocating the old, simple, and in many respects misleading, two-decker view of human existence.  
18 Cf D. Krech, R. S. Grutchfield, E. L. Ballachey, Individual in Society (New York/London, 1962), pp 383ff, who write: 'All groups serve to meet the power-want of some of the members and the belongingness-want of most of the members'. Obviously the authors do not think that these purposes are unique and exclusive, nor need the 'belongingness-want' be overtly expressed or even recognized. Religious orders do after all have to guard against 'ambition', while ambition for 'prelacy' in the hierarchical Church has officially been regarded as legitimate. The climate of opinion is of course changing after Vatican II.
turned especially on the latter fact. Canon Law on clerics and the Constitutions of religious orders have by no means ignored the dangers of the situation. As a problem, the matter was well in the open before the redaction of the first gospel: ‘... that these two sons of mine may sit, one at your right hand and one at your left, in your kingdom’ (Mt 20, 21). The ‘belongingness want’ is clearly expressed and with pathos in John 13–17. Critics, who have disliked the intrusion of human nature into the New Testament world, have often complained of the notorious Frühkatholizismus, the organizational corruption as they saw it, which had apparently crept into the pauline churches especially. Any revisionary reading of the gospel (such as ‘renewal’ following Vatican II must necessarily be) must also protest against excessive concessions to the ‘belongingness want’ or to the ‘power want’ of the individual. Nor can the process avoid hidden, and doubtless unwanted, threats to the individual. Personal faith and religious existence cannot be isolated either. We are driven back to the fact that, given our societal needs and dependency, our anxiety about ourselves is also an anxiety about our relationship with Christ. If one asks, is that good or is it bad, then the answer must lie in the quality of one’s acceptance of Christ himself.

Where groups are concerned, the same phenomenon is surely to be observed. We cannot ostracize from our thinking about the christian life, the fact of the extraordinary growth of the Pentecostal movement or movements. We know that there are in existence groups of varying sizes and in great numbers. They cut across denominational boundaries, across clerical-lay boundaries; and it is worth noting that they tend very especially to escape from the largely male domination of ecclesiastical structures. They tend also to have an ecstatic character, and they cherish their undifferentiated and egalitarian qualities. Perhaps more obviously significant here is the fact that they try and answer demands for ministries such as healing, for mental health generally and sometimes also for deviant behaviour. Their activities, as we know, include the occasional practice of exorcism of those in ‘possessed’ states. Here again we are not raising the problem of how good or less good such phenomena may be, nor what ought, if anything, to be done about them. Nor do we have to say anything to try and account for their presence. If we are content to note the existence of the phenomenon on the large scale on which it is to be found, and if we note the vagueness inherent in their

37 For a recent general account, see John Richards, But Deliver Us from Evil, An Introduction to the Demonic Dimension in Pastoral Care (London, 1975). Some idea of the extent of the malaise can be gauged from the following: Richards claims that in West Germany at present there are 10,000 persons engaged in witchcraft, and for this country a B.B.C. estimate puts the figure twice as high. When Alex Sanders, ‘The King of the Witches’, appeared on I.T.V. screens, ‘their switchboards were jammed not with complaints but with requests for help’ (cf Richards, pp 77–8, my italics). The picture is rounded off when we hear that according to a belgian survey, more women and unmarried men had read The Divine Milieu by Teilhard de Chardin (a reassuring work which indulges the ‘oceanic feeling’) than had read The Phenomenon of Man (cf. A. Vergote, Psychologie Religieuse [Brussels, 1966], p 76).
doctrinal expressions, then we observe how easily all chimes in with a generalized anxiety state among believers. Distressing? Perhaps. But anxiety does not contradict the presence of faith, hope and love in Christ.

To exemplify the matter in the most individual, yet abstract way, let us construct a religious identikit picture of the ‘troubled priest’. He may be in young middle age, socially and culturally well-established in catholic ways of life. He has had a protected childhood, schooling and seminary life. No longer of the generation for whom church learning and an ability to stand on their own feet intellectually was a respected and expected asset, he has enough university experience to feel ill at ease with the church learning he does have and which he now tends to distrust. His situation ‘in the world’ is, as he thinks, a second-class one; and his situation within the Church is no longer protected. The identity quest is thus inevitable. It would be easy to continue the fantasy. I merely want to suggest how in practice a responsible, believing christian, finding himself confronted with the demands of a theologia crucis within his own life of the spirit, finds himself at a cross-roads in faith, and specifically in his faith in Christ whose declared follower he is. What was comforting about the old has apparently let him down, and seems hollow. The new asks for a commitment for which he is theologically and spiritually unprepared. If one considers the problem in that light, then factors such as ‘a row with the bishop’, ‘falling in love’, can be seen to be quite adventitious. The quite tragic suffering over faith-fidelity to Christ must be looked at from within.

The doctrine that ‘the faith cannot be doubted without some moral fault’ has led to over-protection. For the present I have tried to high-light one type of situation, in which, it seems to me, anxiety in faith in Christ has to be accepted, not for its confused origins, but for what it basically can become, an awareness of God in life itself. It implies an acceptance of the theologia crucis and can always be urged on the sufferer in gospel terms: ‘was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer...?’ (Lk 24, 26).

18 Vatican I applied to ecclesiastical faith what Trent, following Augustine, had applied to justification and grace, namely that God does not abandon unless he is himself abandoned (cf Denzinger-Schönmetzer, 3014, and, for Trent, 1537).