THEOLOGICAL TRENDS

Christian Ethics: The Last Ten Years

Prelude to the eighties: rumblings and ground-clearings

A study of Christian ethics over the last ten years requires a recollection of the preceding years. Whereas the eighties were a rich period concerning persons, virtues and histories, the seventies were a time almost singularly devoted to norms and moral reasoning. Whereas the eighties were a time of establishing new and fresh ground for a much more personal yet still very objective moral theology, the seventies were a time of reaction and debate. The eighties looked to the future; the seventies fought against the past.

The seventies really began when a young theologian, Peter Knauer, looked at the old principle of double effect. In the fifties, particularly in Pius XII’s reign, the principle had been often invoked. Many without much familiarity with the history of moral theology effectively equated moral reasoning with the principle. This preposterous claim was made by Knauer who argued that the rightness or wrongness of any action is determined by the principle of double effect. In doing this, however, he ‘revised’ the principle by eliminating three of the four conditions for the principle. The fourth condition, the argument for proportionate reasoning, became the principle for moral reasoning.

The renowned Bruno Schueller argued that Knauer’s claims were historically wrong. Later, others would support Schueller: double effect functioned only in particularly complex questions and recent attempts to rely on it were not terribly traditional. Despite the historical complaint, however, Schueller engaged Knauer’s description of moral reasoning, and a revisionist school was born. This school would evaluate the moral licitness of conduct through a weighing of values. Proponents and opponents of the school spent the seventies in debate.

The debate between the old and the new school became described as the debate between deontologists and proportionalists. In general they disputed three particular questions. First, are there any actions which are in se prohibited absolutely? One response was a comprehensive critique of the claims of intrinsic evil, another was an historical analysis of the concept, and yet another reclassified the concept as ‘ontic evil’ arguing that generally, but not always, certain actions ought not to be done. Second, was proportionalism a form of consequentialism? This charge was refuted through exceptional and persuasive defences by proportionalists. Third, was this school a major departure from previous forms of moral reasoning? Herein the conservatives left the progressives with a clear yes.

Fundamental moral theology in the seventies was a debate about normative moral theology that followed on the heels of Vatican II.
Surprisingly, the Council hardly addressed moral theology. With the exception of some paragraphs in *Gaudium et spes*, the only concrete reference to moral theology was two sentences in *Optatam totius*. In the aftermath of the Council, however, moral theologians, especially Fuchs and Häringer, continued developing a moral theology in the context of the theology emerging from Vatican II. Their efforts to restore a personalist, discipleship model were well received by moral theologians, but the promulgation of *Humanae vitae* effectively denied to moral theology the charge given to other areas of theological reflection: to develop. This first post-Vatican II moral declaration denied the claims of the Vatican II moral theologians. Thus a debate arose.

The debate between deontologists and proportionalists was really an extension of a debate about authority. This debate asked whether in specific moral matters the ordinary magisterium’s authority to teach was equal to its authority to bind. If through *Humanae vitae* the papal magisterium made moral theological claims, then many moral theologians needed to establish considerable and well-documented limits to the magisterium’s prerogatives on moral matters.

This debate over authority also entered into the question of the contribution the scriptures make to moral theology. During an evidently dreadful moment in moral theology, many writers asked what was distinctively Christian in ethics and answered, ‘Nothing normative’. Fortunately, Gaffney, Macquarrie, and Rigali rephrased the answer and gave us some indication of a narrative, Christological context for moral reflection. But these were exceptions to the writings on both sides of the debate.

The seventies saw considerable turmoil about what rules there are and who makes them. Indeed, a certain lack of fecundity pervades a perusal of those writings, but such periods are rarely times of birth and newness. This conflict was not unlike those fought by the scripture scholars and systematic theologians before the council. Like those times, the seventies were for many moral theologians a period of assertiveness, of ground-clearing, of autonomy. The foundations of moral theology as a modern science sought freedom from the trappings of anything threatening its autonomy. But because moral theology is not an isolated science but one that expresses the social self-understanding of the believer before God, moral theology needed to reflect on its life in the Church, on its method, on its relationship with other theological disciplines, and on the world.

The eighties: a new science begins?

The eighties demonstrated considerable work in determining a specific and autonomous science. This science was, however, particularly fragmented. For instance, comprehensive writings in the eighties were rare, and seminary and university professors were hard pressed to find teachable and contemporary texts. Instead, there were collections of essays, notably the six
volumes of *Moral theology*, which McCormick and Curran published through Paulist Press. More recently Hamel and Himes published their *Introduction to Christian ethics*. Similarly, by the end of the eighties, Georgetown University Press published the translations of Josef Fuchs’ work, three volumes of essays. The essay form of expressing the reactions in the seventies was reproduced in the eighties as moral theologians sought to build an autonomous science. Exceptions such as O’Connell’s *Principles of Catholic morality*, Gula’s *Reason informed by faith*, and Boeckle’s *Fundamental moral theology* appeared but rarely did an instructor find adequate satisfaction with one of these. Rather, generally an anthology served as any introductory book’s companion.

Since there was such a plethora of articles, anthologies alone did not unify the discipline. Commentators arose, and the most significant one became Richard McCormick who authored *Notes in moral theology: 1965 through 1980*, the most consulted ‘text’ of the eighties, which was a collection of the most consulted ‘texts’ of the seventies. McCormick provided an enormous service during these years, keeping the reader informed of recent publications, commenting on the arguments proposed, and giving the contributions context as he assigned subheadings to each of the works. From this, the dialogues of the eighties would begin.

Though these anthologies and commentaries illustrate both the fragmentary and the seminal nature of the movement, they represent significant steps to establishing a collaborative discipline. Such collaboration became evident in the dictionaries which appeared as early as 1967 in England and later in Italy and Germany and are soon expected in the United States. These dictionaries further summarized and unified the published insights of moral theology after the Council.

Collaborations in anthologies, commentaries and dictionaries are the essential tools of any science and any newly reconstructed science needs to be familiar with the history that precedes it. As the seventies marked a period of independence which sought to revise the extended tradition and to reject the more recent manual tradition, the eighties demonstrated a confident desire to know its history so as to evaluate it. These works were divided into two categories: histories on the development of specific methods and studies into the development of moral theology itself.

John Gallagher’s *Time past, time future: an historical study of Catholic moral theology* distinguished between a pastoral approach to moral theology and a more scientific understanding of it. He argued that the manuals were a logical development of that tradition which produced the penitentials in the latter half of the first millennium and the *Summae confessorum* of the late Middle Ages, all of which were source books for pastoral care givers. Gallagher argued that what is called moral theology today is in no way an extension of that manual tradition. For Gallagher, recent works are more akin to the science found at a university and should be called, therefore, Catholic theological ethics. In providing us with a history of the manual
methods, Gallagher suggested that the moral theologian today, looking back, finds strangers instead of ancestors.

Bernard Hoose's *Proportionalism: the American debate and its European roots* traced from 1965 to 1980 the development of the new moral method and through his narrative provided us with an understanding of the uniqueness of this method. The two works together gave us a glimpse of the major forms of moral reasoning from the more recent tradition.

Before proportionalism or the manuals was casuistry, and Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin presented in *The abuse of casuistry* a veritable tour de force. They both narrated the history of casuistry from its roots in the Rabbinic, Greek and Roman traditions to its rise especially in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe and presented the stunning arguments from Blaise Pascal's *Provincial letters* (1656) which were the immediate cause of casuistry's decline. They argue that the case method was so authoritative that it never achieved sufficient self-consciousness to enunciate its own method. To fill that lacuna the authors did just that and in the process argued convincingly (I think) for a return to the case method as opposed to that method which simply applies particular principles to specific situations.

Like the other works, this narrative actually provided us with a particularly valuable analysis of a method long presumed to be understood.

Though neither avowedly theological nor historical, Alasdair MacIntyre's *After virtue* belongs in the same category as the other three books. MacIntyre, in probably the most discussed philosophical work of the decade, argued that the present state of moral reasoning has neither foundation nor structure due to certain shifts in epistemology during and since the Enlightenment. Prior to the Enlightenment, he found, however, a tripolar method of moral reasoning which answers three questions: who am I, who ought I become, what steps ought I take to attain that goal I set for myself? The work attempted to challenge the moral legitimacy of liberalism and proffered virtue as the proper context for any moral reasoning.

Emphasizing particular contents instead of method, John T. Noonan presented histories of moral reasoning on usury, contraception, and abortion. Later, the rector of the Alphonsianum Louis Vereecke published more than twenty-five essays concerning a variety of moral thinkers hitherto unknown and inaccessible (John Mair, Domenico Concina and Martin Le Maistre), as well as Ockham, Liguori and Sanchez. If, and I believe they will, moral theologians seek further to understand the method and content of the moral reasoning, principles and ideals of their ancestors, then easily Noonan and Vereecke will be acknowledged as the forerunners and founders of historical moral theology.

Historical moral theology entered maturity through the monumental work by John Mahoney, *The making of moral theology: a study of the Roman Catholic tradition*. In eight chapters, Mahoney provided a study on the nature and concerns of moral theology's history. In particular, he analysed its preoccupation with sin and objectivity as well as its renewed preference for
the subject as opposed to the abstract and so-called objective law. He concluded the work recognizing the growing importance of the principle of totality as well as the continuing appreciation for diversity, while recalling a need for a greater appreciation for mystery. From this work the reader could argue that totality and diversity would be key elements for developing an ethics of virtue inasmuch as first, virtue ethics is more concerned with the development of the whole person as opposed to the moral evaluation of specific acts and second, virtue ethics recognizes that different individuals must take different steps to arrive at the telos or goal which best realizes the particular virtuous person.

Moral theology then shows in the last decade a remarkable development. Whereas the seventies were war-torn years of moral theology trying to attain a particular level of competence and autonomy, the eighties marked a period of building. The anthologies, dictionaries and commentaries all done in collaboration were eventually complemented by these histories which were also commentaries on and endorsements for particular moral methods. These years put down foundations in history and established structures in methods, but they also offered, especially in the English-speaking world, a new way of looking at the moral life, through the virtues. 42

Virtue ethics

Alasdair MacIntyre's After virtue served as a particular cornerstone for a moral method that would be less act-based or principle-based. Rather, this method relied on an anthropologic teleology. Less concerned with particular acts than even the proportionalists were, this ethics looked to contexts: to who we are and who we ought to be. 43

In the world of theology, two non-Catholic writers particularly advanced interests in virtue ethics. Stanley Hauerwas in a variety of works made his readers aware of the facts that people continue to shape themselves and that their communal self-understanding is shaped by a narrative that continues to be written by the lives its members live. 44 In particular, Hauerwas argued that the definition of the narrative is defined by the community's relationship to the stranger and to the weak.

In a different way Gilbert Meilaender examined the virtues, particularly religion, gratitude and curiosity and their effect on the moral life. 45 Later he considered the specificity of Christian love and asked how it plays out in the life of the individual and the community. 46 This love, which asks more than duty could, is the animating force of the believing community.

In the wake of these works, Catholic writers abandoned their tendency to emphasize objective actions and individual accountability (for which they have been continuously critiqued). 47 Still, rather than abandoning the person in favour of the community, these writers decidedly accepted relationships as the context for considering the moral life, thus avoiding the enduringly Catholic individualist model.

Lisa Sowle Cahill in her Between the sexes: foundations for a Christian ethics of sexuality looked at the people we become through relationships and sought to
find insights for right ways of living. In particular, her turn to relationships was at once a turn to the scriptures and to the differences of gender. This departure from evaluating particular sexual acts with a list of permissions and prohibitions and this unmistakable turn to context to find the best way of living faithful lives demonstrated the significant strides made in the past twenty years of moral reasoning.

Relationship is the key to Margaret Farley's *Personal commitments: beginning, keeping, changing.* Rather than a deontologist's rules or a proportionalist's sliding scale, Farley presented cases (about ten of them) and led us through ordinary situations to find out how we decide and become the people we try to be. Refreshing, thorough and pertinent, Farley's work implicitly espoused Thomas Aquinas' understanding of the virtues and achieved what Josef Pieper aimed at: a presentation of a virtue that would be recognizably appropriate for ordinary life.

Paul Waddell's *Friendship and the moral life* was another wonderful example of how Catholic writers look to particular virtues in the context of relationship and write accessible books for educated readers. Waddell gave a personal context in which we literally get to know the author as well as the thinking of Aristotle and Aquinas. "The project of the moral life is to become a certain kind of person." Like Farley and Cahill, Waddell demonstrated that the moral project is worked out in the lives that are lived in relation to others.

The moral project then is to develop, and precisely that insight guided Charles Shelton's thesis in *Morality of the heart: a psychology for the Christian moral life.* Shelton turned to developmental structures advocated by psychologists, Kohlberg, Gilligan and Hoffman. In particular he critiqued Kohlberg's idealized individualism and offered a more relational model.

The development of virtue ethics took decisive steps when it left these fundamental issues and became applied in both medical and social ethics. In medical ethics, rather than examining which procedures are licit and which are not, moral theologians endorsing virtue ethics raised fundamental questions about the type of people we are becoming as we face a variety of medical issues on euthanasia, abortion, genetics, reproductive technologies and the mentally challenged. In particular, the keynote address of the twentieth anniversary celebration of *The Hastings Center* highlighted the importance of determining moral action according to the end, that is, the type of people we want to become. Nonetheless, in this area which requires spontaneous decisions, the more acute work of developing a medical prudence remains outstanding.

Though, for practical reasons, social ethics still appealed to articulated principles and rights, a number of works appeared in the eighties which appropriated the insights of virtue ethics. The most enduring development of a social ethics in the context of virtue appeared in the writings of McDonagh whose relational call-and-response model translated well contemporary social virtues. Among other things, Hollenbach brought the
principles of justice into the context of the sacramental life of the Church.\textsuperscript{61} Hauerwas\textsuperscript{62} and Yoder\textsuperscript{63} offered through a narrative of the scriptures their strong pacifism as a key for social ethics. In Black Africa, Latin America, the United States and Europe the virtues were given cultural context in the special edition of \textit{Concilium} 1987.\textsuperscript{64} Moser and Leers provided a critique of both the manualists and the proportionalists and offered the virtues as the context for a social ethics growing out of a liberation theology.\textsuperscript{65} Like the liberation theologians, the feminists find virtue offering them a context as well.\textsuperscript{66}

\textit{A religious ethics with a future}

The eighties marked perhaps the most fruitful years yet in moral theology. Dictionaries, anthologies and commentaries have been developed, the history narrated and methods evaluated, and now a particular method, virtue ethics, expresses well a suitable context for moral theologians to collaborate with one another on a variety of concerns. The explicit tasks of this form of ethics are to set a goal for the type of people we ought to become, to understand ourselves as the people we are, and to see what are the significant steps we should take or avoid to achieve this end. This ethics becomes as suitable for contemporary Catholic moral theology as did Aristotle's \textit{Nicomachean ethics} for Aquinas' \textit{Summa theologiae}. Moreover, only fifteen years after the earlier debate over the scriptures and norms, virtue ethicists are finding in the scriptures the narratives of a pilgrim people trying to become the people they are called in covenant to become. We find there images of people who embody virtues that speak to us today, a cross which lights our horizon enabling us to see ourselves as sinful but saved, and a promise from our loving God that we shall come to know the kingdom.

In conclusion, as the nineties begin, let me suggest what we may find published and discussed by the end of this century: first, a profound turn to the scriptures, which Catholic moralists have not done since the high Middle Ages; second, a further extension of virtue theory into social and medical ethics as well as significant inroads into business, legal and media ethics; third, a sustained engagement of the fundamental insights of the two newest and richest methods in theology, feminism and liberation theology; fourth, a significant discussion between communitarian concerns and liberal interests; and fifth, a profound development of the history of moral reasoning with particular attention to Aquinas and Augustine, as well as other lesser known practitioners of practical reason. On this last point there will be likewise an examination of those figures of the twentieth century who left an objectified and ossified natural law for human prudence. Therein the works of Häring, Fuchs, Janssens, and Demmer will hopefully be examined and evaluated at length. It was their vision of discipleship both before and after the Council which helped resurrect moral theology from the rubble.

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20. On this development see Keenan: 'Should we appoint judges to determine whether the moral theology taught at Catholic universities is actually Catholic?' *Assembly 1989: Jesuit ministry*
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44 For example see his A community of character (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).


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49 Philip Keane's *Sexual morality: a Catholic perspective* (New York: Paulist Press, 1977) represented a transitional work inasmuch as it tempered the highly abstract yet supposedly objective evaluation of sexual acts with concerns for the growing person. Nonetheless the objective morality and the individual were still Keane's primary concerns. Still, one could aver that Cahill's work would not have been possible had Keane not taken the turn to the subject.


52 p 136.


64 *Changing values and virtues* edited by Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier (Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd, 1987).
